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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, elected officials, legal commentators, and the
national media have focused a great deal of attention on federal
statutes that impose obligations on state and local governments
without funding the costs of compliance.' State and local officials
frequently complain about the severe impact of these unfunded
mandates2  on their budgets:3 the rising cost of such mandates
may force states to increase taxes, cut back on existing services, or
1. See, e.g., Paul Gilmor & Fred Eames, Reconstruction of Federalism: A Constitu-
tional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGMS. 395 (1994);
Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New Federalism": Devolu-
tion, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97 (1996); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfund-
ed Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment On Public Choice, Public
Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1993); Spencer Rich, GOP Gover-
nors Protest Senate Medicaid Bil4 States Object that Mandates Could Be Costly, WASH.
PoST, Oct. 10, 1995, at A4; Steven Walters, Thompson Warns Against Mandates; He Says
Congress May Try to Give States Its Problems But Cut Funding, MILWAUKEE J. & SEN-
TirNE, July 18, 1995, at As.
2. As it is commonly used, the term "unfunded mandate" is a double misnomer.
First, it usually does not refer exclusively to mandates that are completely unfunded, but
rather to any mandate that is inadequately funded-that is, both unfunded and
underfunded mandates. See; e.g., Gillmor & Eames, supra note 1, at 395 n.1; Zelinsky,
supra note 1, at 1366. Second, the label "mandate" is often applied to obligations that
states assume voluntarily in order to qualify for federal funds. See, e.g., Dan Luzadder,
"Forced" Federal Mandates Irk GOP, RocKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 28, 1997, at 18A; 2
U.S.C. § 1555 (Supp. I 1995) (defining "Federal mandate," for certain purposes of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, as "any provision in statute or regulation or any Feder-
al court ruling that imposes an enforceable duty upon State, local, or tribal governments
including a condition of Federal assistance or a duty arising from participation in a vol-
untary Federal program"); see also David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE
LJ. 1, 81 (1994) (questioning whether such obligations are truly voluntary, considering
states' "dependency on federal funds akin to addiction"). This Note will follow the com-
mon practice of using the terms "unfunded" and "mandate" in their broader senses.
3. See, e.g., John A. Leman, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands and the
Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1237, 1242-43 n.23 (1995) (re-
porting state governors' estimate that federal mandates have been responsible for 80% or
more of new spending in annual budgets.); see also Gillmor & Eames, supra note 1, at
396 (describing impact on state budgets of federally mandated Medicaid expansions).
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forgo the addition of new services! Furthermore, unfunded man-
dates may decrease the political accountability of members of
Congress, who create the mandates but place the burden of paying
for them-through politically painful methods like raising taxes or
decreasing existing services--on state and local officials.5 As far as
the states are concerned, "unfunded" is a dirty word.
But is there anything constitutionally repugnant about the fact
that a particular federal mandate is not accompanied by adequate
funding? States claiming that a federal mandate should be struck
down on Tenth Amendment grounds6 frequently argue that the
inadequacy of funds for implementation strengthens their claim of
unconstitutionality.7 For the most part, courts have rejected this
argument-but without explaining why. This Note attempts to
provide courts with a simple yet previously unexplored reason to
disregard funding when assessing the constitutionality of a
challenged federal mandate: examining the adequacy of funding
would involve the courts in policy issues that must be left to the
legislative branch. When a federal mandate is challenged in court,
only the structural nature of the mandate, not the adequacy of its
funding, should dictate whether the statute will be upheld.'
Federal mandates have been around for a long time, but
strong complaints and legal challenges from the states are a rela-
tively recent phenomenon.' Most likely, this activism is tied to the
increase in the number of unfunded mandates:0 as one commen-
tator has noted, "so long as the federal government supplied states
4. See, eg., Gillmor & Eames, supra note 1, at 395, 404-05.
5. See id. at 406; Edward A. Zelinsky, Accountability and Mandates: Redefining the
Problem of Federal Spending Conditions, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 482, 484 (1995).
6. That is, on the grounds that Congress has acted outside the scope of its enumer-
ated Article I powers. See U.S. CoNST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.").
7. See infra notes 35-41, 60-69 and accompanying text.
8. The Supreme Court has developed several tests for invalidating federal mandates
based on the structure or nature of the mandate; these are discussed infra at text accom-
panying notes 19-24.
9. See Louis Fisher, The Ubiquity and Ambiguity of Unfunded Mandates, 4 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 472, 474-76 (1995).
10. The increase in unfunded mandates, in turn, is usually attributed to the growing
federal budget crisis: the federal government has found it necessary to cut spending (or
at least reduce increases in spending), yet it continues to pass new regulations even
though it cannot supply funds to implement them. See Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 1366 &
n.32. But see id. at 1364 (arguing that there are more complex reasons for the increase
in unfunded mandates, which he explains in terms of public choice theory).
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with sufficient funds, complaints were minimal."" As the number
of unfunded mandates has grown, so has the cumulative effect of
paying for them; state officials perhaps cannot afford not to chal-
lenge some new mandates. The political controversy that surrounds
a particular mandate may also influence an official's decision to
challenge it.
Two recent politically-controversial and inadequately-funded
mandates have prompted a number of constitutional challenges,
providing an opportunity to examine courts' treatment of the
funding issue. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA or
"Motor Voter" Act)12 and the Brady Handgun Violence Preven-
tion Act (Brady Act),' both passed by Congress in 1993, stem
from highly charged political issues; neither provides for full reim-
bursement of the states' costs of implementation.'4 The Brady
Act is one of the most controversial gun-control measures ever
passed in the United States, consuming over seven years of con-
gressional debate before finally becoming law." The Motor Voter
Act, which requires states to facilitate voter registration in various
ways, seems, on its face, less likely to invite controversy, but its
passage also involved partisan politics: the statute was expected to
significantly boost Democratic party registration. 6 These political
factors undoubtedly played a role in state officials' decisions to
resist the imposition'of these two federal mandates by fighting
them in court. 7
11. Fisher, supra note 9, at 474.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
14. The Brady Act authorizes grants to states for use in creating and improving
computerized criminal records systems, but does not authorize such funds to be used to
cover the costs of performing the background checks required by the Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 note (Funding for Improvement of Criminal Records). The Motor Voter Act au-
thorizes partial, but not full, reimbursement of states' costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg.
15. See Ann Devroy, Brady Bill Is Signed into Law; Gun Control Backers Hail
Reagan, Clinton, WASH. POsT, Dec. 1, 1993, at AS.
16. See, eg., ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
Motor Voter Act "is widely believed to favor Democrats").
17. All six states that formally resisted implementing the Motor Voter Act were led
by Republican governors (Pete Wilson of California; Jim Edgar of Illinois; John Engler
of Michigan; Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania; David Beasley of South Carolina; and George
Allen of Virginia). See STATE YELLOW BOOK, Winter 1997, at 40, 125, 222, 373, 392 &
448. And personal opposition to the Brady Act may have been part of some sheriffs'
decisions to challenge that statute. See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 834 (2d Cir.
1996) (No. 95-2006) (Miner, J., concurring) ("Sheriff Frank voluntarily took on the
CLEO function, apparently for the sole purpose of challenging the Brady Act."), petition
19971
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Ironically, the characteristics of a congressional mandate that
are most important to state officials-the level of funding accom-
panying it and partisan political issues behind itt--are quite un-
important when it comes to deciding the merits of a Tenth
Amendment challenge. When evaluating the constitutionality of a
federal law imposing duties on the states, courts should be con-
cerned not with the law's funding and political popularity, but
rather with how the command to the states is structured.
In its modern federalism cases, the Supreme Court has set
forth several rules for determining when a mandate to the states is
constitutional. A statute is invalid if it exceeds the scope of the
constitutional power under which Congress purports to be legislat-
ing.19 A mandate will also be struck down if it directly instructs a
state legislature to enact particular legislation: "Congress may not
simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.'" A statute that requires states to choose between two
or more regulatory options is unconstitutional if the Constitution
does not "authorize Congress to impose either option as a free-
standing requirement."'" A statute providing financial incentives
for a state to adopt a particular policy may be invalid if the finan-
cial inducement is "so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pres-
sure turns into compulsion.' '  And a state may argue that it
for cert filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3856 (June 13, 1996).
However, not all litigation related to the Brady Act involves officials unwilling to
carry out the Act. In Roy v. Kentucky State Police, 881 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Ky. 1995),
county sheriffs sued the state police to determine which group would have the privilege
of carrying out the Brady Act duties. See id. at 290.
18. As one commentator observed, "The central issue [for politicians at the state lev-
el] is not the legitimacy of federal action; it is the relative balance (or imbalance) of
federal and state funding." Fisher, supra note 9, at 474. This is not to say that legitimate
constitutional concerns are never behind a state government's decision to resist imple-
menting a federal mandate. The degree of intrusiveness of a federal mandate on state
autonomy may also prompt state resistance to a federal mandate. See infra notes 20-22
and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (holding that Gun-
Free School Zones Act exceeds the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause power); Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996) (holding that the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act exceeds Congress' Indian Commerce Clause authority).
20. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144' 161 (1992) (alteration in original)
(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981)).
21. Id. at 175-76.
22. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (citations omitted). Dole also
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should be excused from complying with a generally applicable law
because of "failings in the national political process" that led up
to the statute's enactment.' However, "[n]o Supreme Court deci-
sion has applied the Tenth Amendment to invalidate congressional
action on the ground that the action constituted an 'unfunded
federal mandate."'24 None of the above tests involve an inquiry
into whether the amount of funds accompanying the legislation is
sufficient, and the lower federal courts should not take it upon
themselves to create such a test.
Part I of this Note will describe the duties imposed on the
states by the Motor Voter Act and the Brady Act, and will exam-
ine lower courts' treatment of the funding issue in cases challeng-
ing the constitutionality of those statutes. Part II will demonstrate
that the few statements the Supreme Court has made on the issue
of funding for such mandates militate against treating the presence
or absence of funding as a determinative factor in a challenge to a
federal mandate. Part H will argue that, as a general rule, the
adequacy or inadequacy of funding is not relevant to the constitu-
tional analysis because of a fundamental separation of powers
principle: Congress, not the judiciary, is responsible for determin-
ing the appropriate amount of funds that will accompany federal
legislation. Part Ill will also discuss exceptional circumstances that
might justify taking funding into account.
states that conditions attached to federal grants must be in pursuit of the general welfare,
see id. at 207; that Congress must enable states to exercise their choice knowingly, "cog-
nizant of the consequences of their participation," id. at 207; that the conditions must be
related to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs, see id. at
207-08; and that the conditions must not be barred by other constitutional provisions
such as the First Amendment, see id. at 208. But see Engdahl, supra note 2, at 62, 81
(observing that conditions attached to federal funds are rarely, if ever, struck down on
grounds of coercion or lack of germaneness).
23. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985); see also
ii at 550-57 (finding that since structural safeguards of the national political process ade-
quately protect state interests, "judicially created limitations" on federal power are not
necessary absent evidence of defects in the political process, id. at 551); New York, 505
U.S. at 160 (limiting Garcia's holding to laws of general applicability). However, the
Supreme Court has not made clear exactly what would constitute a "defect" in the politi-
cal process. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988).
24. Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 965 (D.S.C. 1995).
1997]
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I. LOWER COURTS AND THE FUNDING ISSUE:
Two EXAMPLES
A. The "Motor Voter" Act
In 1993, acting pursuant to its Article I, Section 4 power to
regulate federal elections,' Congress passed the National Voter
Registration Act,' which requires states to allow individuals to
register to vote in federal elections when applying for a driver's li-
cense.' The Act also requires states to provide for voter regis-
tration by mail and at disability and public assistance agencies."
The Act does not provide for full reimbursement of states' costs,
although some federal funding may be available to cover a part of
the costs incurred by state agencies.29
Several states, including California, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, and Virginia, refused to implement the stat-
ute, emphasizing its inadequate funding." When faced with law-
suits filed by voter organizations and the Justice Department,
these states claimed that the Motor Voter Act exceeded Congress'
Article I powers and thus violated the Tenth Amendment.31 In
25. "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994).
27. See id.
28. See id. §§ 1973gg-2 to gg-5.
29. See ACORN v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 976, 980 n.2 (W.D. Mich. 1995); ACORN v.
Ridge, Nos. CIV.A.94-7671, CIV.A.95-382, 1995 WL 136913, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
1995).
30. See ACORN v. Edgar, 880 F. Supp. 1215, 1216-17 (N.D. Ill. 1995), affd, 56 F.3d
791, 798 (7th Cir. 1995); Ridge, 1995 WL 136913, at *1; Wilson v. United States, 878 F.
Supp. 1324, 1326 (N.D. Cal. 1995), affd sub nom. Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60
F.3d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996); ACORN v. Miller,
912 F. Supp. 976, 979 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 955
(D.S.C. 1995). The Virginia case, Richmond Crusade for Voters v. Allen, resulted in an
unpublished oral ruling. See No. 3:95CV357 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 1995). These cases involved
lawsuits initiated by voter groups and the Justice Department against state officials, as
well as suits by state officials seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the statute.
See, eg., Condon, 913 F. Supp. at 948.
In Maryland, the NAACP sued the state in order to speed up implementation of
the Act; the state has been cooperating with voters' groups and does not contest the
Act's validity. See Todd Shields, Groups Sue Maryland Over Motor-Voter Law: Action
Says State is Lax on Implementation, WASH. POST, July 23, 1996, at D3.
31. See Wilson, 878 F. Supp. at 1327 (describing California's position that "Congress
exceeded the scope of its enumerated constitutional powers by requiring a state to ex-
pend resources to carry out a congressional mandate"); Ridge, 1995 WL 136913, at *6
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each case, the district court rejected this defense and upheld the
statute. The courts reasoned that the Tenth Amendment did not
apply since the Constitution specifically assigns to Congress-and
hence does not reserve to the states through the Tenth Amend-
ment-the authority to make or alter state regulations concerning
the time, place and manner of federal elections:32 "[c]onsequently,
Congress through the [Motor Voter Act] may directly regulate the
state's manner and means of voter registration without invading an
area reserved to the states."33 Both the Ninth and the Seventh
Circuits, the only appellate courts that have reviewed Motor Voter
challenges, affirmed the lower court decisions.'
Several of the states involved in these cases had attempted to
bolster their Tenth Amendment claims with arguments or evidence
relating to the financial burden imposed by the Motor Voter
Act.35 In Wilson v. United States, for example, California argued
that "Congress exceeded the scope of its enumerated constitutional
powers by requiring a state to expend resources to carry out a
congressional mandate."36 The courts' typical response to such an
argument has been to reject it as irrelevant to the constitutional
(noting Pennsylvania's claim that "the NVRA exceed[s] Congress' constitutional grant of
authority over the time, place, and manner of elections found in Article 1, Section 4 of
the constitution and effectively conscripts state legislatures to implement a federal pro-
gram in violation of the Tenth Amendment."); Condon, 913 F. Supp. at 963 ("South
Carolina's sole claim and defense . . . is that the Act violates the Tenth Amendment.").
Although Governor Miller of Illinois ordered state agencies not to comply with the act
until federal funds were provided, see Miller, 912 F. Supp. at 980, 983, the opinion in
that case did not address funding as a constitutional argument.
32. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 4.
33. Wilson, 878 F. Supp. at 1328; see also Edgar, 880 F. Supp. at 1219 ("By defini-
tion the Tenth Amendment ... does not apply to powers vested in Congress by the
Constitution."); Miller, 912 F. Supp. at 984; Ridge, 1995 WL 136913, at *6-*7 ("It cannot
be doubted that [Article I, Section 4] provide[s] a complete code for congressional elec-
tions . . . to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.");
Condon, 913 F. Supp. at 963 ("Because the Constitution specifically delegates to Congress
the power to regulate federal elections and the NVRA is limited to federal elections, by
its own terms the Tenth Amendment is inapplicable."). The courts also backed up their
decisions with references to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See eg., Edgar,
880 F. Supp. at 1221 (finding that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments' goal of
ending racial discrimination through extension of the right to vote is served through the
Motor Voter Act's attempt to increase voter participation by racial minorities).
34. See Edgar, 56 F.3d at 798; Voting Rights Coalition, 60 F.3d at 1416.
35. See Edgar, 56 F.3d at 793; Condon, 913 F. Supp. at 956; Ridge, 1995 WL 136913,
at *5-*6; Wilson, 878 F. Supp. at 1327.
36. 878 F. Supp. at 1327.
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analysis, without explaining why this is so. Some courts note the
lack of precedent for considering the funding factor as relevant,.7
but they have not articulated a more specific rationale. For exam-
ple, when South Carolina "sought to support its constitutional
arguments with evidence intended to prove that the [Motor Voter
Act] is ... a costly burden on the State," the court simply held
that "all such testimony is irrelevant to determining the constitu-
tionality of the NVRA."38 Although that court explained that
evidence of the cost of implementing the Act was unpersuasive
because such costs were balanced by both related and unrelated
transfers from the federal government,39 it did not elaborate on
its assertion that such evidence was constitutionally irrelevant.
Other courts, including the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
ACORN v. Ridge' and the Seventh Circuit in ACORN v. Ed-
gar,4 followed a similar approach.
B. The Brady Act
The Brady Act provides for the establishment of an
instantaneous national criminal background check system by
1999.42 Once that computerized system is available, licensed fire-
arms dealers will be able to check the eligibility of would-be gun
buyers by contacting the system directly from the point of sale.43
Until that system is in place, an interim provision establishes that
the chief law enforcement officer (CLEO)' of the gun buyer's
37. See, eg., Ridge, 1995 WL 136913, at *8; Condon, 913 F. Supp. at 964.
38. Condon, 913 F. Supp. at 956. See also id. at 957 ("Of course cost is not the
touchstone in this constitutional confrontation . . ").
39. See id. at 957 (discussing federal funds South Carolina's Department of Social
Services received to partially cover costs of Motor Voter implementation as well as large
subsidies received by the same agency for programs unrelated to the Motor Voter Act).
The possible balancing effects of unrelated federal grants are discussed infra at notes
118-23 and accompanying text.
40. See 1995 WL 136913 at *8.
41. See Edgar, 56 F.3d at 796. The Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. United States also ulti-
mately rejected the state's funding argument, but only after demonstrating great sympathy
for the state's plight and suggesting that funding might be relevant in other circum-
stances-specifically, with regard to legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause. See
Wilson, 60 F.3d at 1415 (suggesting that Congress cannot impose financial burdens on
states when acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 note (National Instant Criminal Background Check System).
43. See id.
44. The Brady Act defines CLEO as the "chief of police, the sheriff, or an equiva-
lent officer or the designee of any such individual." 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8). All the
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place of residence is responsible for conducting a background
check.45 Upon receiving notice from a dealer, the CLEO has five
business days to make a "reasonable effort" to ascertain whether
the transfer would violate any federal, state, or local laws.46 The
Brady Act does not provide funding to reimburse the states for
the resources consumed by the background checks and related
duties during the interim period.47
Like the Motor Voter Act, the Brady Act has faced constitu-
tional challenges from state officials charged with its implementa-
tion.' However, the CLEOs have had somewhat greater success
than their Motor Voter counterparts. In five cases, the plaintiffs
were able to convince district courts that the provision requiring
CLEOs to perform background checks violates the Tenth Amend-
ment.49 In striking down the requirement, these courts relied
CLEOs in the Brady Act challenges discussed in this Note were local sheriffs.
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s). States with their own laws providing for background
checks are exempted from the Brady Act. See id. § 922(s)(1)(D). In addition to the
background checks, the Brady Act's interim provisions also require CLEOs to destroy
records related to completed background checks, see id. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i), and to provide
explanations to individuals denied handguns if they so request, see id. § 922(s)(6)(C).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2).
47. The Act does, however, authorize grants for states to use in establishing or iri-
proving computerized criminal records systems. See id. § 922 note.
48. See Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.D. La. 1994); Printz v. Unit-
ed States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994), rev'd sub. nom. Mack v. United States
(Mack I1), 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub. nom. Printz v. United States,
116 S. CL 2521 (1996); McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994), affd
sub. nom. Koog v. United States (Koog fl), 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert.
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3001 (June 25, 1996) (No. 95-2077); Mack v. United States (Mack 1),
856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub.
nom. Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996); Koog v. United States (Koog 1),
852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert.
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 19, 1996) (No. 95-2052); Frank v. United States, 860
F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3856 (June 13, 1996) (No. 95-2006); Frye v. United States, 916 F. Supp. 546
(M.D.N.C. 1995). Unlike the Motor Voter cases, see supra note 30, all the Brady Act
cases were initiated by state officials (the CLEOs).
49. See Romero, 883 F. Supp. at 1089; Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044; Mack I, 856 F.
Supp. at 1383-84; McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 327-28; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519-20.
Although the Brady Act involves the controversial subjects of gun control and the
right to bear arms, none of the courts relied on the Second Amendment in their deci-
sions. See, eg., McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 327 (stating "[t]his lawsuit ... does not implicate
the Second Amendment. This lawsuit involves only the Tenth Amendment and Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution"). And although the trial courts in Printz, McGee, Mack,
and Frank struck down the background check requirement, they upheld the rest of the
Brady Act, including provisions that require CLEOs to destroy records related to back-
ground checks and to provide explanations for denied handgun transfers. See Printz, 854
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heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in New York v. United
States.50 In New York, the Court had declared that "federal ac-
tion [that] would 'commandeer' state governments into the service
of federal regulatory purposes" is "inconsistent with the Const-
itution's division of authority between federal and state govern-
ments.""1 Although New York was decided in the context of
commands to state legislatures,52 these courts extended the
decision's reasoning to situations involving state executive offi-
cials. 3 One district court upheld all the provisions of the Brady
Act against a sheriff's Tenth Amendment challenge, determining
that "the Tenth Amendment does not prevent the federal govern-
ment from imposing minimal duties on state executive officers."54
Three appellate courts have heard Brady Act challenges, and
two have upheld the Act. In a consolidated appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed two district court holdings and ruled that the
background check requirement did not violate the Tenth Amend-
ment, reasoning that the Act's obligations represented only a
"minimal interference with state functions."" The Second Circuit
also reversed a lower court ruling and held that the Brady Act
was constitutional, on similar grounds.16 The Second Circuit dis-
tinguished New York as prohibiting only federal commands to
state legislatures, and not federal commands to state executives.57
F. Supp. at 1519-20; McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 327-28; Mack I, 856 F. Supp. at 1383-84;
Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044.
50. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down certain provisions of the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985).
51. Id. at 175.
52. See id. at 176 ("commandeer[ing] the legislative processes of the States by direct-
ly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program ... has never
been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitu-
tion.").
53. See McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 325-27 (assuming, without discussion, that New York
prohibits commandeering of state executive officials); Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 104143 (re-
jecting government's contention that New York applies only to commandeering of state
legislatures); Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380-81 (same); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513 (same).
54. See Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1388; see also id at 1389 ("I[T]he Brady Act does not
violate Tenth Amendment principles because it does not 'commandeer state legislatures,'
but instead only places minimal duties upon chief law enforcement officers." Id. at 1389).
55. Mack 11, 66 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'g Mack 1, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D.
Ariz. 1994) and Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503.
56. See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 830 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the
burden imposed by the Brady Bill is not "so significant quantitatively that it rises to the
level of a constitutional violation"), rev'g 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994).
57. See id at 827-30. This issue is now on appeal to the Supreme Court. See infra
note 59.
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However, when the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue in Koog v.
United States, 58 it held that the Act's background check require-
ment--"tantamount to forced state legislation"-does violate the
Tenth Amendment.59
In arguing that the Brady Act impermissibly infringes upon
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment, most of
the plaintiffs in these cases, like the officials involved in Motor
Voter litigation, emphasized the amount of resources consumed by
their Brady Act responsibilities.' However, the Brady Act
plaintiffs met with greater success in persuading courts that such
issues are relevant to the Tenth Amendment analysis. The lack of
funding seems to have influenced several of the courts that struck
down the background check requirement.
In Koog, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that local sheriffs'
offices faced "fixed and limited law enforcement resources," so
that enforcing the Brady Act forced them to give up other respon-
sibilities that the states might prefer them to carry out.61 The
court concluded that this use of state resources was a substantial
58. 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed 65 U.S.L.W. 3017 (June 25,
1996) (No. 95-2077), rev'g 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994), and aff'g McGee v.
United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
59. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve the question of
whether congressional "commandeering" of state executives is prohibited by New York v.
United States. See 64 U.S.L.W. 3829, 3837 (June 17, 1996) (consolidating appeals of the
Mack and Printz cases). Oral arguments were heard on December 6, 1996. See id. Al-
though the lack of federal funding issue was not the focus of the Supreme Court appeal,
it was mentioned in briefs and oral argument. See Supreme Court Official Transcript,
Printz, Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503, 1996 WL 706933, at *39, *41-42, *47 [hereinafter Printz
Transcript]; Brief for the United States, Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503, 1996 WL 595005, at *32,
*39 [hereinafter United States Brief]; Brief for the Petitioner [Printz], No. 95-1478, 1996
WL 464182, at *18 [hereinafter Printz Brief].
At the time of publication of this Note, the Supreme Court had not yet announced
its decision. The theory advanced in this Note, however, does not depend on the Court
holding one way or the other in the Printz case. Rather, this Note asserts only that re-
gardless of whether the Court upholds or strikes down the Brady Act's requirements, its
decision should not turn on the fact that federal funding is not provided to cover the
cost of conducting the background checks.
60. See Mack I, 856 F. Supp. at 1375 ("Mack maintains . . . that he does not have
the personnel or funds to [conduct background investigations]."); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at
1507 ("Plaintiff testified that enforcement of the Act forces him to reallocate already
limited resources such that he is unable to carry out certain duties prescribed by state
laws."); Romero, 853 F. Supp. at 1085-86 ("Sheriff Romero argues ...that [he] faces a
severe funding shortage."); Koog I, 852 F. Supp. at 1381 ("Sheriff Koog argues that he
must expend scarce resources of his office on background checks.").
61. 79 F.3d at 460.
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burden: "We do not consider it a minimal interference when a
local sheriff or chief of police is offered no choice but to devote
purely local manpower and monetary resources to check the back-
grounds of countless applicants for handgun purchases." 62 The
United States District Court of Montana, in Printz v. United
States,63 similarly emphasized the "great effort and the expendi-
ture of unfunded resources" required to implement the Brady Act,
noting the deleterious effect on other programs and activities the
state might be interested in providing for its citizens.64 The Unit-
ed States District Court of Arizona, in Mack v. United States,65
also found it noteworthy that "the state is forced to expend time
and resources toward implementation of the Act."66 The West-
em District of Louisiana in Romero v. United States67 seemed to
come closest to basing its decision on the lack of funding. That
court was extremely sympathetic to the plight of the sheriff's of-
fice, repeatedly referring to its "serious funding shortage."68 In
contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits, which upheld the entire
Brady Act, found that the effort required and the resources con-
sumed by the Act were minimal and rejected the sheriffs'
claims.69
H. FUNDING ISSUES IN TiE SUPREME COURT
A. The Insignificance of Funding in Tenth Amendment Cases
Several of the U.S. Supreme Court's modem federalism cases
have touched on the question of whether inadequate funding can,
by itself, make a federal mandate unconstitutional. In each case,
the Court has rejected the notion that funding is a determinative
factor in assessing the constitutionality of a federal statute."
62. Id. at 461.
63. 854 F. Supp. 1503.
64. See id. at 1514-15, 1517.
65. 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994).
66. Id. at 1381; see also Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1032.
67. 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.D. La. 1994).
68. Id. at 1079, 1080, 1085.
69. See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1996); Mack 11, 66 F.3d
at 1031-32; see also Koog 1, 852 F. Supp. at 1388-89 (discussed supra note 54 and ac-
companying text).
70. Members of the Supreme Court have held widely varying views on what, if any,
restrictions the Tenth Amendment places on federal action. Compare, for example, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)
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In National League of Cities v. Usery7t the Court addressed
the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which extended the statute's minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to state employees. 72 The majority not-
ed that while the challenged amendments would cost the states a
significant amount of money, cost was not the dispositive factor.73
Although Justice Brennan disagreed with the outcome of the case,
he agreed with the majority that cost alone should not be determi-
native.74
The insignificance of compliance costs was again noted in
FERC v. Mississippi75 when the Court reviewed the constitution-
ality of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA).7 6 PURPA required state utility commissions to enforce
standards promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) and to follow certain rulemaking procedures.77 The
Court noted Mississippi's claim "that PURPA's requirements must
fall because compliance will impose financial burdens on the
States.78 The Court, however, was unconvinced: "in a Tenth
Amendment challenge to congressional activity, 'the determinative
(finding that the Tenth Amendment provides affirmative limits on congressional power)
and Justice Relmquist's majority opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 842-43, 852 (1976) (same), with Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (stating that the "political process" set forth in the Constitution
adequately protects state sovereignty, and thus there is no need to read the Tenth
Amendment as providing additional substantive protection for the states), and Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
552 (1985) (same). Yet even justices holding very different views of the Tenth Amend-
ment have been able to agree that the financial impact of a federal mandate, by itself, is
not a determinative factor in the constitutional analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 71-74 (noting dissenting Justice Brennan's agreement with National League of Cities
majority on this issue); infra text accompanying notes 84-91 (noting similar views of
Garcia majority and dissent on this point).
71. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
72. See idi at 836.
73. See id. at 846-49, 851-52. Ultimately the outcome in National League of Cities
hinged on the Court's finding that the statute interfered with "the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," id. at 852, a
test the Court has since abandoned, see Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
74. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 874 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("My Brethren's reluctance to rely on the cost of compliance to invalidate this legislation
is advisable.").
75. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 2601-45 (1994).
77. See 456 U.S. at 759.
78. Id. at 770 n.33.
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factor ... [is] the nature of the federal action, not the ultimate
economic impact on the States."' 7 9
The financial burden argument has also failed in Tenth
Amendment cases involving federal regulation of private conduct
that happens to have indirect effects on state coffers. The plaintiffs
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association80
claimed that a statute imposing detailed regulations on the mining
industry violated the Tenth Amendment because it would have
adverse effects on Virginia's economy (such as a reduction in the
tax base)."' In response, the Court stated that "even if it is true
that the Act's requirements will have a measurable impact on
Virginia's economy, this kind of effect, standing alone, is insuffi-
cient to establish a violation of the Tenth Amendment." 8 The
Court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that "an adverse
impact on state and local economies is a barrier to Congress'
exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
private activities affecting interstate commerce. ''
Just as inadequate funding is not, by itself, sufficient grounds
for striking down a statute, the converse is also true: the presence
of generous funding does not compel a conclusion of constitution-
ality. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'
the Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 5 this time
upholding the act as applied to the states. The Court noted that
the federal government, in separate legislation, had provided the
San Antonio transit authority with significant financial assis-
tance,86 but stated that the constitutionality of the challenged
79. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 292 n.33 (1981)).
80. 452 U.S. 264.
81. See id. at 292 n.33.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Supreme Court has made no distinction, for purposes of the funding
issue, between cases where Congress is attempting to regulate state governmental activity
directly, as in FERC, and those in which Congress is regulating private activity with an
alleged indirect effect on state funds, as in Hodel. The Court has found funding equally
insignificant in both situations: in fact, the FERC Court quoted Hodel when it stated that
the determinative factor was the nature of the federal action rather than the ultimate
economic impact on the states. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). The Court had previously examined FLSA in National
League of Cities, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 71-74.
86. See 469 U.S. at 555; see also infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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statute did not depend on that fact: "Our references to [the Urban
Mass Transit Act, a federal statute supplying the states with funds
for public transportation] are not meant to imply that regulation
under the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervail-
ing financial benefits under the Spending Clause. The application
of the FLSA to [the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority]
would be constitutional even had Congress not provided federal
funding."'  Rather, Garcia's outcome depended on the majority's
finding that there was no defect in the political process leading to
the enactment of the statute.88 The majority used the existence of
countervailing federal funds as evidence that the political process
had worked in this case, and that the states had succeeded in
having their financial interests protected in Congress. 89
Dissenting Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger, criticized the majority for
paying even this much attention to the funding issue.9° These
justices asserted that evidence of federal grants to the states was
completely irrelevant to the Tenth Amendment analysis: "Regard-
less of the willingness of the Federal Government to provide fed-
eral aid, the constitutional question remains the same: whether the
federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States
by the Tenth Amendment."'" Thus, all nine Justices agreed that
the presence of federal funding did not control the outcome of the
case, although the majority felt it had some relevance for their
reasoning.
In this way, the constitutional irrelevancy of funding is a two-
way street. Congress' failure to compensate the states for a
mandate's negative impact on state treasuries does not automati-
cally render the act unconstitutional, as shown by National League
of Cities, FERC, and Hodel.92 Likewise, the provision of generous
federal funds will not make an otherwise unconstitutional act93
87. 469 U.S. at 555 n21.
88. See id. at 550-57.
89. See id. at 555 ("[T]he status of public mass transit simply underscores the extent
to which the structural protections of the Constitution insulate the States from federally
imposed burdens.").
90. Id. at 566 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 71-83.
93. Unconstitutional, for example, because the statute violates one of the tests de-
scribed supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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constitutional, as demonstrated by Garcia;94 the federal govern-
ment cannot purchase intrusions into state sovereignty at any
price.
B. Unfunded Mandates Do Not "Indirectly Commandeer" State
Legislatures in Violation of the Constitution
The argument has been made in some of the Brady Act and
Motor Voter cases that forcing states to pay for a federal mandate
constitutes indirect commandeering of state legislatures in violation
of the Tenth Amendment.95 Specifically, the argument runs as
follows: if a mandate does not provide sufficient funds to cover
the cost of its implementation, the state must fund it by giving up
or decreasing other services, or by raising taxes. By thus forcing
the state legislature to allocate funds for activities that Congress,
rather than the state legislature, has identified as important, Con-
gress "indirectly commandeers the legislative processes of the
state" in violation of New York v. United States.96
This reasoning is an unwarranted extension of New York. The
claim that a federal law is invalid if it indirectly requires state
legislatures to allocate funds for implementation has already been
rejected by the Supreme Court. In South Carolina v. Baker,97 the
Court upheld Section 310 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982,98 which required that long-term bonds issued
94. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89. Of course, states may be less likely to
complain about infringements on state sovereignty when a federal mandate is accompa-
nied by generous funding. See supra text accompanying note 11.
95. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (holding that a congressional attempt to "com-
mandeer" state legislatures-i.e., "directly compelling them to enact .. . a federal regula-
tory program"-is unconstitutional) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
96. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994), rev'd sub. nom.
Mack v. United States (Mack I1), 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub. nom.
Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996); see also Koog II, 79 F.3d 452, 458-60 &
n.7 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Brady Act in effect legislates new job duties for
state officials and amends state criminal codes), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3001
(June 19, 1996) (No. 95-2052); Printz Brief, supra note 59, at *21-22 (same); ACORN v.
Ridge, Nos. CIV.A.94-7671, CIV.A.95-382, 1995 WL 136913, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
1995) (rejecting Pennsylvania's argument that the Motor Voter Act "effectively con-
script[s] state legislators to implement a federal program in violation of the Tenth
Amendment").
97. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
98. 26 U.S.C. § 1030) (1982) (repealed 1988). The content of this section is now
embodied in 26 U.S.C. § 149(a) (1994).
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by state and local governments be in registered form in order to
qualify for a federal income tax exemption for interest earned on
the bonds.9 The National Governors' Association (as intervenor)
contended that Section 310 commandeered state legislatures in
violation of the Tenth Amendment "because many state legisla-
tures had to amend a substantial number of statutes in order to
issue bonds in registered form and because state officials had to
devote substantial effort to determine how best to implement a
registered bond system."'" The Court rejected this argument:
Such 'commandeering' is ... an inevitable consequence of regu-
lating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands compli-
ance. That a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take
administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with
federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that
presents no constitutional defect.''
The Court further observed that under the National Governors'
Association's theory, "any State could immunize its activities from
federal regulation by simply codifying the manner in which it
engages in those activities."' "ca If a mandate is to be struck down
under an extension of New York's prohibition on commandeering,
it would have to be under the principle that Congress cannot com-
mandeer state executive branch officials to carry out federal
laws1 (--not on a theory that any action that can be character-
99. See 485 U.S. at 512-13.
100. 'id. at 514.
101. Id. at 514-15. Although Baker was decided before New York's holding that fed-
eral commandeering of state governments is unconstitutional, the rule against comman-
deering had already been articulated in other Supreme Court cases by the time Baker
was decided. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982) (observing that "this
Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and
enforce laws and regulations"); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (finding Surface Mining Act constitutional in part because
"there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program");
see also New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (citing FERC and Hodel in support of New York's
holding).
102. Id. at 515.
103. while the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly stated that commandeering of
state executives is unconstitutional, it is possible to infer such a principle from New York.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-55 (discussing lower court's reasoning in Brady Act
cases that New York prohibits commandeering of state executive branch officials); see
also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (arguing
that Framers "envisioned federal commandeering of state executive officers," id. at 1960).
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ized as "indirect commandeering" of state legislatures is invalid.
In sum, "there is no law to support [the] position that because
a state must bear the cost, the legislation therefore fails to pass
constitutional muster."' 4 The Supreme Court cases discussed in
this section demonstrate that courts must look to the nature of the
federal action at issue without regard to whether the states bear
the financial burden of that action. There is no precedent for con-
sidering the absence or alleged inadequacy of funding as a deter-
minative factor in the constitutional analysis of a federal mandate;
in fact, the Court has consistently rejected the suggestion that the
level of funding should be a determinative factor.
However, no majority opinion of the Court has ever discussed
why funding carries so little weight in the constitutional analy-
sis."5 There is in fact a very good reason not to take the level
of funding into account when conducting the constitutional analysis
based on the separation of powers doctrine: examining the level of
funding provided and evaluating its sufficiency would involve the
courts in issues of policy that must be left to the legislature, and
thus courts must avoid making such an inquiry. Part III discusses
this rationale in greater depth.
III. A SEPARATION OF POWERS BASIS FOR TREATING FUNDING
AS CONSTITUTIONALLY IRRELEVANT
A. Funding: A Question for Congress, Not the Courts
Under the separation of powers doctrine, the fact that funding
is or is not provided is not merely inconclusive; it should not be
considered at all in a Tenth Amendment challenge. Matters of
funding "raise not constitutional issues but questions of policy.
They relate to the wisdom, need, and effectiveness of a particular
project. They are therefore questions for the Congress, not the
courts.''
106
And the Court may very well announce a rule against federal commandeering of state
executive officials in its forthcoming Printz decision. See supra note 59 (discussing the
Printz Supreme Court appeal).
104. ACORN v. Ridge, Nos. CIV.A.94-7671, CIV.A.95-382, 1995 WL 136913, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1995); see also Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 965 (D.S.C. 1995)
("No Supreme Court decision has applied the Tenth Amendment to invalidate congressio-
nal action on the ground that the action constituted an 'unfunded federal mandate."').
105. The lower courts that rejected the financial burden argument also have failed to
provide satisfactory rationales for doing so. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
106. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 874 n.12 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
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The Constitution specifically assigns to Congress the power to
spend money from the federal treasury. 7 Decisions regarding
how much to spend for a particular law fall within the realm of
policy issues left to congressional discretion. For each new unfund-
ed mandate, Congress decides whether to provide funding, and if
so, how much to provide. Both these determinations are policy
issues that should be left to Congress and should not be reviewed
by the courts. As the Supreme Court has noted time and again, its
disagreement with a policy choice made by Congress is not suffi-
cient grounds for invalidating a federal statute so long as there is
a rational basis for the law: "judicial intervention is generally un-
warranted no matter how unwisely [the court] may think a politi-
cal branch has acted."'" The amount Congress has chosen to
provide in any given case may reflect important decisions about
how it wants the mandate to be implemented. For example, Con-
gress may have intentionally allocated a fairly small amount of
funds in order to encourage states to find the most cost-effective
means of implementing the mandate. 9 Problems with determin-
ing how much funding is enough are compounded by the difficul-
ties in determining how much it costs to implement the man-
date. ' A court should not substitute its findings on any of these
dissenting) (quoting Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527 (1941)).
This comment by Justice Brennan, tucked away in a footnote, is perhaps the only refer-
ence in Supreme Court jurisprudence to the separation of powers implications of includ-
ing funding as a factor in Tenth Amendment analysis (or for that matter, the only at-
tempt to provide any sort of rationale at all for rejecting financial burden claims).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Spending Clause, conferring on Congress the power
"to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States"); id. art I, § 9 ("No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
108. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); see also FCC v. Beach Communica-
tions, 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) ("Where there are 'plausible reasons' for Congress'
action, 'our inquiry is at an end."'); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) ("The judicial task is at an end once the court deter-
mines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme.");
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 83 (1976) (discussed further infra notes 117-24 and accom-
panying text); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("My
disagreement with the wisdom of this legislation may not, of course, affect my judgment
with respect to its validity.").
109. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 477 (stating that providing full federal funding and
allowing states to spend the maximum would discourage exploration of inexpensive reme-
dies).
110. See id. at 476-77.
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issues for those of Congress: "[A] legislative choice is not subject
to courtroom factfinding.""'
Furthermore, there are broader, systemic considerations at
work in legislative funding decisions. Congress may have declined
to authorize funds for a specific mandate because it has already
transferred large sums of money to the states for related activities
(including grants for activities not mandated by the federal govern-
ment, which Congress is not obligated to subsidize)... and feels
that those sums help balance out the cost of implementing the
mandate, though they are not specifically provided for implementa-
tion.13
If courts were to review Congress' decision regarding the
appropriate level of funding for a particular mandate, they could
not, in all fairness to Congress, ignore the balancing effect of these
other transfers to the states."4 But the consequences of the fed-
111. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315.
112. For instance, the Violent Crime Control Appropriations Act of 1995, passed
separately from the Brady Act, provided the states with nearly $450 million for general
law enforcement purposes. See tit. 8, Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1777 (1994).
113. For example, the Brady Act authorizes millions of dollars in grants to the states
for improving computerized criminal record systems (and the 1995 Violent Crime Control
Appropriations Act, tit. 8, 108 Stat. 1777, allocated $100 million for this purpose), al-
though it does not authorize funds to cover the cost of conducting the background
checks. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 note (National Instant Criminal Background Check System).
The court in Condon noted that South Carolina's Department of Social Services,
which the state argued would face significantly increased costs as a result of the Motor
Voter Act, was "heavily subsidized by the federal government" for costs related to the
Motor Voter Act as well as for completely unrelated costs like food stamps. See Condon
v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 956-57 (D.S.C. 1995). See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555. As the Court observed in Garcia (in which the city of
San Antonio sought relief from the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the
Fair Labor Standards Act):
Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on the shoulders of States
and localities that operate mass-transit systems, but has provided substantial
countervailing financial assistance as well, assistance that may leave individual
mass-transit systems better off than they would have been had Congress never
intervened at all in the area.
Id. The Court pointed out that "[w]hen Congress first subjected state mass-transit systems
to FLSA obligations in 1966, and when it expanded those obligations in 1974, it simul-
taneously provided extensive funding for state and local mass transit" with the Urban
Mass Transit Act and that Congress had, over a 20-year period, allocated over $20 billion
to states and localities in mass transit aid. Id.
114. Cf. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555 (noting that although Congress has subjected states
and municipalities to minimum wage requirements for mass-transit employees, it also
provides substantial funding to these mass-transit systems, thus balancing the effect of the
FLSA requirements). Similarly, in Condon, the district court noted:
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eral courts examining the big picture in these cases to see if over-
all levels of funding are adequate would be even worse than the
effects of examining whether the funding directly tied to a particu-
lar mandate is sufficient. The courts would then be reviewing an
even broader array of congressional decisions-inquiring into what
programs Congress has chosen to fund, and why-and perhaps, in
effect, telling Congress it should not be subsidizing as many state
activities as it now does.l" This is not the business of the federal
courts. In reviewing congressional mandates to the states, courts
should not review the policy choices made by Congress, because
the legislature is the primary institution charged with making such
choices under the Constitution. Rather, under rational basis re-
view, the courts must defer to Congress on these matters."6
[A]lthough South Carolina complains that it would be required to bear the en-
tire cost of the NVRA, testimony indicated that many of the mandated voter
registration agencies are heavily subsidized by the federal government . ... Of
course cost is not the touchstone in this constitutional confrontation, but South
Carolina's failure even to attempt to examine possible offsetting savings--or
even possible net savings overall-seriously undermines South Carolina's claimed
fiscal concerns about the NVRA.
913 F. Supp. at 956-57.
115. Not only is this approach constitutionally impermissible, it is unlikely to benefit
the states in the long run. If the federal courts did decide to look at funding for particu-
lar mandates and then determined that it was insufficient, Congress might respond by
providing funding for those mandates at the expense of other transfers to the states, that
is, by decreasing the grants it now gives to the states for non-mandated activities (such
as the general law enforcement grants described supra at note 112). As a result, state
treasuries would likely enjoy no net gain, and might even suffer a net loss.
116. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text. The argument against intensive
judicial review of congressional funding decisions could also be phrased in terms of the
political question doctrine, a combination of the justiciability and separation of powers
theories. See ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION § 2.6.1-.2 (2d ed. 1994). Un-
der the political question doctrine, certain subject areas are deemed non-reviewable. See
id. § 2.6.1. In the seminal political question case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
the Supreme Court listed several characteristics of a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impos-
sibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government ....
Id. at 217. Each of these issues is implicated in the case of congressional spending and
funding decisions. However, given the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the political
question doctrine, see CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 2.6.1., and the fact that the Supreme Court
has not specifically identified Spending Clause controversies as non-justiciable political
questions, see id., this Note focuses on general separation of powers principles, rather
than advocating a political question approach.
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The Supreme Court has not yet applied a separation of pow-
ers rationale in the context of a congressional decision regarding
funding of a federal mandate. It has, however, invoked separation
of powers principles and recognized the need to defer to the legis-
lative branch in other settings where Congress has established
monetary levels that Congress decided were appropriate. In
Buckley v. Valeo,"7 the Court was called upon to assess the con-
stitutionality of various provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act.' The provisions challenged under the First Amend-
ment included the recordkeeping and disclosure requirements of
the Act, which were attacked as overbroad. The Act required
political committees to keep records of individuals contributing as
little as $10, and reports of those contributing over $100 were
required to be filed with the Federal Election Commission."' In
spite of the significant First Amendment interests at stake-politi-
cal speech and freedom of association-the Court declined to
consider the possibility that Congress had set the thresholds too
low."2 Although the Court agreed that the low thresholds had
potential to deter political participation and felt that there was
"little in the legislative history to indicate that Congress had fo-
cused carefully on the appropriate level at which to require re-
cording and disclosure,"'' these observations were not sufficient
to warrant holding the thresholds unconstitutional. Rather, the
Court recognized that it must defer to Congress on the issue:
"[W]e cannot require Congress to establish that it has chosen the
highest reasonable threshold. The line is necessarily a judgmental
decision, best left in the context of this complex legislation to
congressional discretion."'"
The context of the Buckley decision is analogous to the issues
a court faces when asked to consider the impact on states of low
(or nonexistent) levels of funding for federal mandates. In both
cases, a court is asked to review the level of money that Congress
felt was appropriate for achieving its goals. In Buckley, Congress
apparently felt that the $10 and $100 thresholds were fair means
of preventing corruption," and the Supreme Court refused to
117. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
118. 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 (1994).
119. See 424 U.S. at 82.
120. See id. at 82-83.
121. Id. at 83.
122. Id.
123. See i&; see also id. at 26 (noting that Act's primary purpose was "to limit the
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review that decision in the absence of evidence that the limits
designated were "wholly without rationality.""12 In the federal
mandate cases, Congress has felt it appropriate to provide certain
funds (or, in some cases, no funds at all), and the courts similarly
must defer to Congress' discretion to establish the appropriate
monetary amounts on this issue.
B. A Possible Exception: Mandates that Threaten States' Existence
It is conceivable that, at some point, a federal mandate might
impose such an overwhelming financial burden on a state as to
threaten the state's very existence."2 If the obligations created
by the Motor Voter Act or Brady Act were so extensive and
expensive that the states were unable to carry on any functions
other than voter registration or gun control enforcement, then it
would be appropriate to consider the mandate's implementation
costs and the lack of federal funding for those costs in assessing its
constitutionality. Only when the very act of complying with the
statute would render the state unable to carry on any other func-
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contribu-
tions").
124. Id. at 83.
125. The Supreme Court has long recognized some degree of state sovereignty, includ-
ig the need to ensure that the states' continued existence as states is not threatened:
[T]he preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are
as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of
the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution,
in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700, 725 (1868)). See also Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926)
(stating that "neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its powers"). The more difficult question has been how to protect
such sovereignty. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547
(1985) ("What has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution's feder-
al structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and con-
tent of those limitations.").
The emphasis here is on protecting states and their governments; therefore, a threat
to a local government or a single department within a local government should not be
enough to justify striking a federal statute when the rest of the state is not affected to
the same degree. The claim made by the plaintiff in Romero, for example, that the law
enforcement agency of a single local jurisdiction within the state was unable to carry out
all its functions, is insufficient to warrant striking the Brady Act. See Romero v. United
States, 883 F. Supp. 1076, 1086-88 (1994); see also Mack II, 66 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th Cir.
1995) (sheriffs Mack and Printz arguing that background checks will "take all of their
time or so much of it that they will be unable to perform their regular county duties").
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tions should a lack of funding become a determinative factor in
the Tenth Amendment analysis. Merely speculative concerns about
such an effect should not be sufficient to justify striking down a
statute, however.1  Rather, the alleged destructive effects would
have to be extremely probable, as well as directly linked to the
lack of adequate funding.
Several courts have acknowledged hypothetical arguments
along these lines in the Brady Act and Motor Voter cases, only to
dismiss the suggestion that they are applicable to the particular
case under consideration. As Judge Posner explained in Illinois'
Motor Voter appeal:
Illinois advances the... notion that to make a state administer
federal elections fatally compromises state sovereignty .... We
suppose, although it seems extraordinarily unlikely, that Congress
might attempt to use the power granted in Article I section 4 to
destroy state government, perhaps by constituting all employees
of the state full-time federal voting registrars in order to make
sure that every eligible federal voter in every state was regis-
tered. Maybe if Congress went that far it could no longer be
thought to be merely altering the state's regulation of federal
elections.'
But the court quickly rejected the idea that such circumstances
were present in the context of the Motor Voter Act: "Evidently
the costs of complying with congressional alterations in the times,
places, and manner of holding federal elections have not imposed
a significant fiscal burden on the states, let alone the kind of stag-
gering burden that might give color to Illinois' argument.""n
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Mack v. United States '29
agreed that at some point, a federal statute enlisting the aid of
state employees to achieve its objectives could become "so burden-
some to the State that it violates the Tenth Amendment": "Surely
the federal government cannot stall the state government in its
tracks by imposing all-consuming federal duties on the State's
126. Cf. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 421 (1938) (holding that, to be immune
from taxes, a state would have to show that "the burden upon the state function is actu-
al and substantial, not conjectural").
127. ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1995).
128. Id.
129. 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub. nor. Printz v. United States, 116
S. CL 2521 (1996).
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employees."' 30 However, the court concluded that the provisions
of the Brady Act do not reach that point.1 3' And the Second
Circuit, upholding the Brady Act in Frank v. United States,' ac-
knowledged that federal legislation could be "so onerous as to
threaten the effectiveness of the States in our federal system,"'33
but likewise found that the burden imposed by the Brady Act was
not "so significant quantitatively that it rises to the level of a
constitutional violation." 134
CONCLUSION
State officials who bring Tenth Amendment challenges to
federal mandates often point to an inadequacy of funding to bol-
ster their claim that the mandate is unconstitutional. But funding
should not be a determinative factor in a Tenth Amendment analy-
sis. Separation of powers principles require Congress, not the
courts, to make decisions regarding funding for the execution of
duties imposed by federal law. The words of the Court in another
context aptly summarize the reasons for rejecting the claim that
courts should review Congress' funding decisions: "[the] argument
is flawed, not only because it lacks precedential support and is
contrary to statements in this Court's opinions, but also because it
invites the Court to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative
task which the Constitution has left to the political processes."'' 5
Some courts, like those that have heard challenges to the
Brady Act, have erred by allowing funding issues to influence their
decisions.16 Other courts, including the Supreme Court and
courts that have heard challenges to the Motor Voter Act, recog-
nize that funding should play no role in the constitutionality deter-
mination, but have not pursued a separation of powers analy-
130. Id. at 1032.
131. See id.
132. 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3856 (June 13,
1996) (No. 95-2006).
133. Id. at 826.
134. Id. at 830. Even counsel for the United States in the MacklPrintz appeal to the
Supreme Court conceded in its brief that there could be a limit to congressional au-
thority to require states to foot the bill for federal mandates. See United States Brief,
supra note 59, at *32-33 & n.22; see also Printz Transcript, supra note 59, at *42-43 (hy-
pothesizing an unconstitutionally extreme "Perfectly Clean Air Act").
135. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (rejecting broadcasting company's
claim that First Amendment entitled it to special access to county jail).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 60-69 (discussing Brady Act cases).
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sis. 37 The rationale set forth in this Note, grounded in the sepa-
ration of powers, provides courts with a solid reason to decline to
consider funding when states urge them to overturn a statute be-
cause it is an "unfunded mandate." 3 ' Likewise, this Note pro-
vides courts with a basis for rejecting arguments by the federal
government that the presence of funding (tied directly to the man-
date or not) should weigh in favor of upholding a statute. The
rule against reviewing Congress' funding decisions should apply
regardless of the constitutional clause Congress has legislated un-
der-whether a highly specific enumerated power like the Article
I, Section 4 power to regulate federal elections (used to pass the
Motor Voter Act) or a broader power, such as the Commerce
Clause (the source of the authority to pass the Brady Act).
While states may believe a rule that prohibits the review of
funding decisions makes challenging unfunded mandates more diff-
icult, such a rule does not restrict any of the methods already
available for successfully challenging a federal statute.'39 For in-
stance, an unfunded mandate can always be challenged on grounds
that it exceeds the scope of the power under which Congress pur-
ports to legislate.' ° A federal law is also unconstitutional if it
directly instructs a state legislature to enact particular leg-
islation . 41 A voluntary condition attached to the receipt of feder-
al funds is invalid if it violates a separate constitutional provision,
such as the First Amendment. And after the Supreme Court
announces its decision in Printz, states might also have the argu-
ment that a mandate enacted under the Commerce Clause uncon-
stitutionally commandeers state executive officials into implement-
ing and enforcing a federal law. Furthermore, the states always
have the right to lobby Congress for relief (in the form of fewer
mandates or more funding).'" But states should not rely on the
137. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41 (discussing Motor Voter cases), 70-94
(discussing Supreme Court cases).
138. Given the high financial costs and political implications of federal mandates, see
supra notes 3-5, 9-17 and accompanying text, such challenges are bound to continue in
the future.
139. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
140. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (holding that Gun-Free
School Zones Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power).
141. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (stating that Congress
may not directly compel states to enact a federal regulatory program).
142. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
143. See supra note 59.
144. The lobbying approach was successful in persuading Congress to pass the Un-
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fact that a federal mandate is inadequately funded to support a
Tenth Amendment challenge. Other circumstances must render the
statute unconstitutional in order for their Tenth Amendment chal-
lenge to be successful.
A rule against treating funding as a determinative factor in
Tenth Amendment analysis actually protects the states against con-
gressional overreaching. If the presence of federal funding were
enough to ensure that a federal mandate would be held constitu-
tional, the federal government could purchase intrusions into state
sovereignty and avoid Tenth Amendment problems simply by
providing funding for an otherwise unconstitutional mandate. By
refusing to allow states to forfeit aspects of their sovereignty in
exchange for federal funds, the rule advocated in this Note pro-
tects the states from their own "best intentions.""14 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority in New York, recognized that
"powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to
view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal
interests."' 6 She explained that "it is likely to be in the political
interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable
to the voters" for certain difficult decisions. 47 As a result, both
state and federal officers might prefer a congressional statute that
forced state officials to make those decisions, even though such a
statute might be unconstitutional. "The interests of public officials
thus may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental
funded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.), in 1995. UMRA requires federal agencies to prepare
statements estimating and explaining the costs of any proposed federal regulations that
may require state or local governments to spend, in the aggregate, $100 million or more
in a single year. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (Supp. I 1995). UMRA also requires the Congres-
sional Budget Office to estimate the costs of new federal mandates being considered by
Congress. See id. § 658. However, it remains to be seen how successful UMRA will be
in reducing unfunded mandates. The long-term effectiveness of the statute may be limit-
ed: "A future Congress seeking the political benefits of a new unfinanced mandate will
not be deterred by a prior Congress' anti-mandate commitment." Zelinsky, supra note 4,
at 484 n.2; see also Gillmor & Eames, supra note 1, at 409 (arguing that a statutory
solution to the unfunded mandate problem would be inadequate, and therefore a consti-
tutional amendment is needed to address the problem). Furthermore, it will be difficult,
if not impossible, to enforce UMRA; agency actions taken under the act are subject to
only limited judicial review, see 2 U.S.C. § 1571, and the inadequacy of or failure to pre-
pare estimates or statements required by UMRA cannot be used as grounds for inval-
idating an agency rule. See id. § 1571(a)(3).
145. New York, 505 U.S. at 187.
146. Id. at 182.
147. Id. at 182-183.
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allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to
the direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly
being advanced."'
State officials are concerned, understandably, about the grow-
ing number of unfunded federal mandates, and may initially op-
pose the rule this Note proposes. In the long run, however, a rule
that excludes funding issues from Tenth Amendment analysis pro-
tects the states against congressional intrusions into state sover-
eignty, while allowing states to pursue traditional means of chal-
lenging federal statutes on Tenth Amendment grounds.
148. Id. at 183; see also id. at 182. (stating that "[w]here Congress exceeds its authori-
ty relative to the States ... the departure cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state
officials").
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